Every major American war has been paid for with some combination of taxes, borrowing, and — in a few cases — inflation. This page is about the borrowing part: the war loans and bonds the U.S. Treasury has sold to the American public, and occasionally to foreign governments, to raise the capital a war requires. It walks the long arc from Revolutionary War loan certificates through the Civil War’s Jay Cooke operation, the five WWI Liberty Loans, the $185.7 billion WWII Series E campaign, and today’s TreasuryDirect savings-bond program — with a few notes from an equipment-finance lender who thinks about plain-English credit-instrument communication as a working problem.

From Chris

I do not have a historical-finance specialty. What I do have, though, is a working lender’s interest in how complex credit instruments get explained to non-specialist audiences. I write The Lease Guy blog for exactly that reason — a term sheet or a Section 179 calculation can look impenetrable on first read, and most of the value I deliver to business owners is translating it into decisions they can actually act on. When I started reading about the Liberty Bond and Series E campaigns, the thing that struck me is how recognizable the underlying communication problem is. It is the same problem, at a vastly larger scale: take a complicated credit instrument and make it intelligible to someone whose day job is something else.

So this page is a straight history of how America financed its wars with public debt, with a short lender’s section at the end pulling out three patterns I find useful from nearly two decades of watching equipment-finance deals get structured and sold.

How wars actually get paid for

A government fighting a war has three basic ways to fund it. It can tax its citizens, which raises money immediately but is politically unpopular and can only go so far. It can borrow, either from banks and foreign governments or directly from its own public, which spreads the cost into the future. And, in extremis, it can print money — issuing fiat currency faster than the economy can absorb it — which is inflationary and eventually destructive. Every American war has used some mix of the first two, and a few have resorted to the third.

A war loan is an umbrella term for government debt raised specifically to fund war costs. A war bond is a specific instrument within that category: a debt security sold to individual citizens, usually in denominations small enough that ordinary households can buy them, usually marketed with an explicit patriotic appeal alongside the financial return. The pages that follow walk through how this second category — the retail-scale public war bond — has evolved across American history.

Revolutionary War and the early Republic

The American Revolution was financed by a combination of paper currency (the infamous Continental dollars, whose rapid loss of purchasing power gave English the phrase “not worth a Continental”), foreign loans from France and the Netherlands, and a series of domestic interest-bearing loan certificates issued by the Continental Congress. The certificates were a form of war loan in the modern sense — debt securities paying interest, intended to be held to maturity — but the distribution network was narrow and most holders were wealthy patriots, merchants, and foreign creditors.

The foundational act of postwar federal finance, though, was Alexander Hamilton’s 1790 Funding Act. The newly constituted federal government assumed the outstanding Revolutionary War debts of the individual states and restructured them into long-dated federal bonds. The consolidation established the full-faith-and-credit of the United States as a reliable borrower, which then made it possible to issue federal debt to fund later conflicts — beginning with the War of 1812, which was paid for largely with interest-bearing Treasury notes and bonds rather than significantly higher taxation. The American public-debt market that would later support Liberty Bonds and War Bonds starts here.

Civil War: Chase, Cooke, and the 5-20 Bond

The American Civil War is where the modern U.S. war bond as a mass-retail instrument really begins. Salmon P. Chase, Abraham Lincoln’s Treasury Secretary, faced financing requirements that dwarfed anything the Treasury had raised before, and existing bond-sales channels — banks and a small circle of wealthy New York investors — could not absorb the volume.

Chase’s solution was to contract with Philadelphia banker Jay Cooke & Company to run the Union’s retail bond-sales operation. Cooke built something the country had never seen: a nationwide sales network of thousands of agents, advertising the bonds in newspapers and selling them in small denominations directly to ordinary households — farmers, teachers, shopkeepers, and wage-earners. The most famous of the Civil War issues was the 5-20 Bond, so named because the Treasury had the option to redeem it in not less than 5 years and not more than 20, and it paid 6 percent interest in gold coin. Cooke’s network placed those bonds at a scale previously reserved for bank syndicates.

The pattern Cooke built — decentralized retail sales, small-denomination bonds, patriotic marketing paired with a financial return — is the direct ancestor of the Liberty Bond and Series E campaigns that followed. When William McAdoo designed the WWI Liberty Loan operation half a century later, he was in essence running the Cooke playbook at the scale a fully industrialized economy could support.

World War I: the Liberty Bonds

The United States entered World War I in April 1917. Treasury Secretary William McAdoo — who at the time also chaired the Federal Reserve Board, which had been established only three years earlier — was tasked with financing American participation. He chose a deliberate strategy: roughly one-third of the war’s cost would come from new taxes and roughly two-thirds from borrowing directly from the American public through a series of bond campaigns he named, explicitly, Liberty Loans.

The Treasury issued four Liberty Loan bond campaigns between April 1917 and September 1918, followed by a fifth campaign in 1919 called the Victory Liberty Loan — five bond issues in all. The campaigns were operated in partnership with the Federal Reserve banks, which handled distribution, and were promoted through an unprecedented volunteer-driven marketing machine. McAdoo was explicit that the bond drives were as much an educational effort as a fundraising one: the public would be taught about government debt, the objectives of the war, and the country’s financial capacity, and would be asked — from schoolchildren buying Thrift Stamps to millionaires buying large tranches — to do their part.

The marketing arm of the Liberty Loan operation produced some of the most recognizable commercial art of the 20th century. Poster artists including Howard Chandler Christy, James Montgomery Flagg (whose “I Want You” Uncle Sam was adapted for the Liberty Bond campaigns), and Joseph Pennell created images that were printed and distributed in the hundreds of thousands. The Library of Congress holds one of the largest surviving collections of these posters today. Silent-film stars — Charlie Chaplin, Mary Pickford, and Douglas Fairbanks — toured the country on celebrity bond drives. According to the National Archives, the campaign saturated American public life: posters, pamphlets, buttons, and stickers were distributed at scale, and many businesses across the country decorated their storefront windows with Liberty Bond advertising.

Liberty Bonds paid interest in a range between roughly 3.5 percent and 4.75 percent, depending on which of the five issues a bond came from and what maturity was chosen. According to Federal Reserve History, about 20 million Americans purchased Liberty Bonds by the end of the war, and the four wartime Liberty Loan drives raised more than $17 billion for the U.S. war effort. Including the 1919 Victory Liberty Loan, contemporary summaries put the cumulative total above $21 billion across all five issues — a scale of retail federal-debt placement the country had never approached before, and the institutional groundwork for the even larger operation that would follow twenty-five years later.

World War II: Series E and the $185.7 billion campaign

The United States began preparing for possible entry into World War II well before Pearl Harbor. On April 30, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced a new Treasury retail savings instrument called the Series E Defense Savings Bond. The next day, Roosevelt himself purchased the very first Series E bond — serial number 1 — from Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau. After the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Defense Bond was renamed the War Savings Bond, the form the instrument took for the rest of the conflict.

The Series E was engineered specifically for small-denomination, mass-retail sale. Buyers paid $18.75 for a bond with a face value of $25, which matured in ten years — an effective yield of roughly 2.9 percent compounded. Smaller and larger denominations (all the way up to $1,000 face-value bonds) were available, but the $25 bond was the retail workhorse. It was cheap enough to buy on a weekly paycheck, and the structure was simple enough for a new buyer to understand in a minute.

The sales operation was unprecedented. The Ad Council coordinated an advertising campaign that ran across newspapers, magazines, radio, and newsreels. The Office of War Information produced and distributed promotional material. A volunteer network modeled on the Liberty Loan committees of a generation earlier — schoolteachers, factory payroll departments, corner-store owners, door-to-door bond sellers — handled most of the actual selling. Celebrity bond tours featured Kate Smith, Bing Crosby, and Bob Hope; Irving Berlin wrote “Any Bonds Today?” as a campaign anthem. Norman Rockwell’s Four Freedoms paintings were produced for the Seventh War Loan Drive in 1943. By the end of the war, roughly 85 million Americans — roughly half the U.S. population at the time — had bought war bonds, and the overall campaign had raised approximately $185.7 billion, according to figures the U.S. Treasury and the Treasury’s historical archives have published widely.

That figure is worth pausing on. Measured in its own-era dollars, it is the largest retail-scale public-debt placement any country has ever executed. Measured in what it did to American household behavior, it was also a generational training in the habits of saving and in the idea of a private citizen as an investor in federal debt — an idea that before Jay Cooke’s Civil War operation had barely existed in the United States at all.

Cold War and the modern Treasury

The Series E continued to be sold as a peacetime retail savings instrument after 1945, gradually shedding its wartime framing and becoming simply “the U.S. savings bond” that a generation of American children received as birthday and graduation gifts. It remained in continuous issue for almost four decades. In 1980, the Treasury retired the Series E and replaced it with the Series EE, which carried the same small-denomination, long-maturity retail design. Paper Series EE bonds were discontinued in 2012, and the program moved fully online through TreasuryDirect. Series I inflation-indexed bonds were introduced in 1998 and continue to be offered alongside the EE.

The modern U.S. Treasury does not run era-specific “war bond” drives the way the Liberty Loan and Series E campaigns did. Today, the Treasury funds federal operations — including defense — through continuous market-based auctions of Treasury bills, notes, and bonds to institutional and retail investors. The retail savings-bond program is a residual of the World War II effort, kept alive because the product itself (a small-denomination, inflation-protected, long-maturity saving instrument) is useful to American households even outside wartime. But the idea of a mass-retail public-debt campaign as a wartime policy instrument is largely historical, rather than current, practice.

A chronology of American war finance

Two and a half centuries of public-debt war finance

A chronological pass through the milestones covered above. This list is intentionally static — no filter buttons, no JavaScript — because the era structure reads naturally in sequence.

  1. 1776–1783Revolution
    The Continental Congress finances the American Revolution with a combination of Continental paper currency, foreign loans (France, the Netherlands), and domestic interest-bearing loan certificates.
  2. 1790Early Republic
    Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s Funding Act assumes the states’ outstanding Revolutionary War debts into federal debt, establishing the full-faith-and-credit of the United States as a bond issuer.
  3. 1812–1815War of 1812
    The War of 1812 is financed largely through Treasury notes and bonds — the first major federal wartime borrowing under the Hamiltonian framework.
  4. 1862–1864Civil War
    Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase and Philadelphia banker Jay Cooke run the Union’s bond-sales operation at retail scale; the 5-20 Bond, paying 6 percent in gold, is placed with ordinary households through a nationwide network of thousands of agents — the first mass-retail U.S. war bond.
  5. April 1917WWI
    The United States enters World War I. Treasury Secretary (and Federal Reserve Board chair) William McAdoo launches the first Liberty Loan.
  6. 1917–1918WWI
    Four Liberty Loan campaigns (Liberty Loans 1–4) are run through the Federal Reserve banks, with volunteer-driven marketing and poster art by Christy, Flagg, Pennell, and others.
  7. 1919WWI
    The fifth and final Liberty-era issue, the Victory Liberty Loan, closes the program. According to Federal Reserve History, roughly 20 million Americans bought Liberty Bonds; the four wartime drives raised more than $17 billion, and contemporary summaries put the cumulative total above $21 billion across all five issues.
  8. April 30, 1941WWII
    President Roosevelt announces the Series E Defense Savings Bond. The next day he purchases bond serial number 1 from Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau.
  9. December 1941WWII
    After Pearl Harbor, the Defense Bond is renamed the War Savings Bond, which is the form the Series E takes for the rest of the conflict.
  10. 1941–1945WWII
    Seven War Loan Drives, backed by the Ad Council and the Office of War Information, sell Series E bonds at $18.75 per $25 face-value bond. Celebrity tours (Kate Smith, Bing Crosby, Bob Hope) and Norman Rockwell’s Four Freedoms paintings anchor the campaign’s commercial art.
  11. 1945WWII
    The overall WWII campaign raises approximately $185.7 billion from roughly 85 million Americans — roughly half the U.S. population at the time.
  12. 1980Postwar
    The Series E is retired. The Treasury replaces it with the Series EE savings bond, carrying the same small-denomination, long-maturity design.
  13. 1998Modern
    The Treasury introduces the Series I inflation-indexed savings bond alongside the Series EE.
  14. 2012Modern
    Paper Series EE bonds are discontinued. The retail savings-bond program moves fully online through TreasuryDirect.

A lender’s view

I spend most of my working hours at Crest Capital structuring equipment financing for American small and mid-sized businesses, and writing about it on The Lease Guy. From that seat, three patterns in the long history of American war finance feel recognizable.

Pattern 1 — Plain-English translation is a credit-market problem in every era

A Liberty Bond offering prospectus in 1918 was not an easy read. Neither is a modern equipment-finance term sheet. The Treasury solved its version of this problem in 1917 by building an explicit education-first campaign: McAdoo named the securities “Liberty Bonds” rather than something technical; the Federal Reserve banks coordinated volunteer bond salespeople who could answer questions in small-town bank lobbies; and the marketing art leaned on plain visual appeals rather than technical detail. The $18.75-for-a-$25-bond structure in WWII did the same job at even greater scale, because “you save eighteen dollars and change, you get twenty-five dollars in ten years” is a sentence an eight-year-old can understand. In my experience on the equipment-finance side, the same principle applies to leases, loans, and tax-treatment decisions. The underwriters and the authors who translate clearly do more good for a market than the ones who sound most sophisticated.

Pattern 2 — The rate environment always shapes the deal structure

Liberty Bonds paid 3.5 to 4.75 percent across the five issues because the WWI rate environment and the wartime alternative uses of capital required them to. The Series E paid effectively 2.9 percent across its WWII decade because the Federal Reserve, under an explicit wartime low-rate policy that lasted until the 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord, made that rate competitive for the retail saver. In equipment finance today, the same mechanic applies at a smaller scale. In my experience, equipment-loan pricing often lags Fed moves and tends to adjust in smaller increments, depending on benchmark rates, credit profile, collateral, term, and market conditions. A shop that signs a five-year equipment lease in 2023 and one that signs the same lease in 2026 is pricing the same asset against different rate regimes — and the deal structure, not the equipment, is what changes.

Pattern 3 — Citizens as capital providers is the long-run through-line

Before Jay Cooke built his Civil War sales network, the United States government did not really borrow from ordinary households. Wealthy patriots and foreign creditors had held the Revolutionary War certificates; New York banks had held most of the early-Republic federal debt. Cooke changed that. The Liberty Loan and Series E programs built on the change at progressively greater scale until roughly half the country was a Treasury creditor. The cultural legacy is that the American household has, for about a century and a half now, been trained to think of itself as potentially a capital provider — to government, to banks, and indirectly, through deposits and brokerages, to every borrowing business in the country. That is the demand side of why the modern equipment-finance market exists, and it runs on a foundation that was partly built in wartime for wartime purposes.

Frequently asked questions

What is a war bond?

A war bond is a government-issued debt security sold to the general public to help finance a war. In the United States, the two most famous examples are the WWI Liberty Bonds (1917–1919) and the WWII War Bonds that began as Series E Defense Bonds in 1941. Bondholders lend money to the Treasury for a fixed term; the Treasury pays interest over that term and repays the principal at maturity. War bonds are typically marketed with a patriotic appeal as well as a financial return, and they have historically been sold in small denominations so ordinary households can buy them.

How much did the United States raise through WWI Liberty Bonds?

Between April 1917 and 1919, the U.S. Treasury ran four Liberty Loan campaigns plus a 1919 Victory Liberty Loan — five bond issues in all. According to Federal Reserve History, about 20 million Americans purchased Liberty Bonds by the end of the war, and the four wartime Liberty Loan drives raised more than $17 billion. Including the 1919 Victory Liberty Loan, contemporary summaries put the cumulative total above $21 billion across all five issues. Treasury Secretary William McAdoo (who also chaired the Federal Reserve Board at the time) explicitly designed the campaigns as an educational effort, not a money-market operation — the goal was to teach the public about government debt while raising the capital the war required.

What was different about WWII War Bonds?

On April 30, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced a new Series E Defense Savings Bond, and the next day he purchased the first one from Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Defense Bond was renamed the War Savings Bond (the “War Bond”). The Series E bond was specifically designed to be accessible to ordinary Americans — it was sold in small denominations (with buyers paying $18.75 for a $25 face-value bond that matured in ten years), the campaigns were backed by unprecedented advertising support from the Ad Council and the Office of War Information, and the sales network relied on volunteer workers rather than a paid sales force. By the end of the war, about 85 million Americans — roughly half the U.S. population — had purchased bonds, and the program had raised roughly $185.7 billion.

Who was Jay Cooke and why does he matter?

Jay Cooke was a Philadelphia banker who, working with Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase, ran the Union’s Civil War bond-sales operation. His innovation was essentially a 19th-century version of what the Liberty Bond and Series E campaigns would later do at much larger scale: Cooke built a nationwide network of thousands of agents who sold U.S. Treasury bonds — most famously the 5-20 Bonds (payable in not less than 5 and not more than 20 years) — in small denominations directly to ordinary households rather than only to banks and wealthy investors. The democratization of U.S. government debt starts with Cooke’s operation, and every American war-bond campaign since has built on the same template.

Do war bonds still exist?

The specific category of a “war bond” — marketed explicitly as wartime finance — is not currently offered in the United States. The Treasury’s retail savings-bond program, which is the direct institutional descendant of the Series E, continues today as the Series EE and Series I bonds, sold electronically through TreasuryDirect. Paper Series EE bonds were discontinued in 2012. The Series E was retired in 1980 and replaced by the Series EE; the Series E had already been the workhorse of the Treasury’s retail saving program for nearly four decades by that point, long after the war that created it had ended.

Why did WWII war bonds pay a lower rate than Liberty Bonds?

Liberty Bonds paid interest rates in the roughly 3.5-to-4.75-percent range across the five issues, depending on maturity and timing. The WWII Series E Defense/War Savings Bond paid an effective rate of about 2.9 percent compounded — the $18.75 purchase price grew to $25 over ten years. The difference reflects the overall rate environment each war was financed in. In WWI, market interest rates and inflation were both elevated and the Treasury had to compete with other investment alternatives for capital. In WWII, the Federal Reserve explicitly held short-term interest rates low (a policy that continued until the 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord), which lowered the rate the Treasury had to pay on its own debt. The same equipment-finance principle applies today: rate environments shape deal structures, whether the deal is a wartime bond or a machine-tool lease.

Selected sources

  • Federal Reserve History — Liberty Bonds The Federal Reserve System’s essay on WWI Liberty Loans, including McAdoo’s education-first design, the Federal Reserve banks’ role in distribution, the four wartime Liberty Loan drives, rate structure, volunteer marketing effort, the 20-million-purchaser figure, and the more than $17 billion raised during the wartime drives.
  • U.S. National Archives — Liberty Bound or Liberty Bond The National Archives’ exhibit article on the WWI Liberty Loan poster program — George Creel’s Committee on Public Information, the role of poster propaganda, and one specific Liberty Bond poster as a case study of the campaign’s commercial-art reach.
  • Library of Congress — World War I Posters The Library of Congress’s digitized WWI poster collection, including a War Bonds & Funds subject category that surfaces a substantial body of Liberty Loan campaign material from 1917–1918.
  • TreasuryDirect — The Volunteer Program and Series E Savings Bonds The U.S. Treasury’s account of the Series E Defense Savings Bond rollout, including the April 30, 1941 Roosevelt announcement, Secretary Morgenthau’s sale of bond serial number 1, the program’s reliance on volunteer sales effort, the broad family-level purchasing pattern, and the 1980 replacement by the Series EE.
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond — Paying for World War I: The Creation of the Liberty Bond The Richmond Fed’s Econ Focus economic-history piece on WWI finance, including the approximately one-third-taxes, two-thirds-bonds split that shaped McAdoo’s financing strategy and the Fed’s operational role as distribution agent.
  • U.S. Department of State — Office of the Historian: Foreign Loans and the Revolutionary War The State Department’s Office of the Historian on the financing of the American Revolution, including the French and Dutch loans negotiated by Benjamin Franklin and John Adams — the early-Republic context Hamilton inherited and reorganized in the 1790 Funding Act.